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**ОРУС АРХИВДИК ДОКУМЕНТТЕРИНИН НЕГИЗИНДЕ АБЫЛАЙДЫН
АЛАТООЛУК КЫРГЫЗДАР МЕНЕН БОЛГОН МАМИЛЕСИНИН
ӨЗГӨЧӨЛҮКТӨРҮ
СПЕЦИФИКА ВАЗИМООТНОШЕНИЙ АБЫЛАЯ С АЛАУТАУСКИМИ
КЫРГЫЗАМИ НА ОСНОВЕ РОССИЙСКИХ АРХИВНЫХ ДОКУМЕНТОВ
THE SPECIFICS OF ABLAI'S RELATIONS WITH THE ALAUTAU KYRGYZ BASED
ON RUSSIAN ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS**

Кыскача мүнөздөмө: Жунгар хандыгы кулагандан кийин XVII-XVIII кылымдар бою ойрат-калмак жортуулдарына каршы ийиндеш туруп келген кыргыздар менен казактардын ортосундагы келишим солкулдады. Буга жунгарлардан бошотулган Алатаудын түндүгүндөгү Жетисуу жайлоолоруна жана конуштарына ээлик кылуу укугу боюнча кыргыз жана казак феодалдарынын ортосундагы талаш-тартыштар себеп болгон. 50-жылдардын аягында бул жерлерди Улуу Жүздүн казактары басып алган, бирок 60-жылдардын башында аймактык талаш ачык согушка айланып кеткен. Ошентип, изилдөөнүн максаты – хандын сөз болуп жаткан аймактагы ишмердүүлүгү тууралуу сейрек кездешүүчү маалыматтарды архивдик материалдарды пайдалануу менен орус архивдик документтеринин негизинде Абылай менен Алатоолук кыргыздардын мамилесин изилдөө. Омск областынын мамлекеттик тарых архивинин (ГИАОО) жана Оренбург облусунун мамлекеттик архивинин (ГАОрО) фонддорунун документтери иштин баштапкы базасы болгон. Мунун аркасында айрым тарыхый фактыларды, анын ичинде XVIII кылымдын 60-80-жылдарында Абылайдын Алатоолук кыргыздар менен болгон мамилесинин контекстиндеги ишмердүүлүгүн, бул маселеге Россия империясынын мамилесин аныктоого мүмкүн болгон.

Аннотация: После падения Джунгарского ханства было поколеблено согласие между кыргызами и казахами, плечом к плечу противостоявшими ойрато-калмыкским набегам на протяжении XVII-XVIII веков. Причиной этому послужили споры между кыргызскими и казахскими феодалами за право владения жетысуйскими пастбищами и стойбищами к северу

от Алатау, освобожденными от джунгар. В конце 50-х годов эти земли занимали казахи Старшего жуза, однако в начале 60-х годов территориальный спор перерос в открытую войну. Таким образом, целью исследования является изучение взаимоотношений Абылая с алаутаускими кыргызами на основе российских архивных документов, привлечения архивных материалов для изучения редких сведений о деятельности хана в рассматриваемом регионе. Источниковой базой работы послужили документы из фондов Государственного исторического архива Омской области (ГИАОО) и Государственного архива Оренбургской области (ГАОрО). Благодаря этому удалось выявить некоторые исторические факты, в том числе о деятельности Абылая в контексте его взаимоотношений с алаутаускими кыргызами в 60-80-х годах XVIII века, и позицию Российской империи по этому вопросу.

Abstract: After the fall of the Dzungar Khanate, the agreement between the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, who stood shoulder to shoulder against Oirat-Kalmyk raids during the XVII-XVIII centuries, was shaken. Disputes between Kyrgyz and Kazakh feudal lords over the rights to the Jetysu pastures and camps north of the Alatau, liberated from the Dzungars, contributed to this. In the late 1750s, these lands were occupied by the Kazakhs of the Senior Horde, but in the early 1760s, the territorial dispute escalated into open warfare. Thus, the aim of the study is to examine the relations between Ablai and the Alatau Kyrgyz based on Russian archival documents, drawing on archival materials to explore rare information about the khan's activities in the region under consideration. The source base for the study included documents from the State Archive of the Orenburg Oblast (GIAOO) and the State Archive of the Omsk Oblast (GAOrO). This enabled the identification of historical facts, including Ablai's activities in the context of his relations with the Alatau Kyrgyz in the 1760s-1780s, and the stance of the Russian Empire on this matter.

Негизги сөздөр: Абылай; батырлар; султандар; хандар; казактар; кыргыздар; эл аралык мамилелер; казак-кыргыз мамилелери; Россия империясы; Цин империясы.

Ключевые слова: Абылай; батыры; султаны; хан; казахи; кыргызы; международные отношения; казахско-кыргызские отношения; Российская империя; Цинская империя.

Keywords: Ablai; batyrs; sultans; Khan; Kazakhs; Kyrgyz; international relations; Kazakh-Kyrgyz relations; Russian Empire; Qing Empire.

Ыраазычылык. Макала Казакстан Республикасынын Илим жана жогорку билим берүү министрлигинин «Абылай, Уали жана Бөкей хандарынын мамлекеттик ишмердүүлүгүнүн изилденбеген этаптары (сейрек кездешүүчү архивдик жана фольклордук булактардын негизинде)» гранттык каржылоо долбоорун ишке ашыруунун алкагында даярдалган (каттоо номери: AR 19680406).

Благодарность. Статья подготовлена в рамках реализации проекта грантового финансирования Министерства науки и высшего образования Республики Казахстан «Неисследованные этапы государственной деятельности ханов Абылая, Уали и Бокея (на основе редких архивных и фольклорных источников)» (регистрационный номер: AP 19680406).

Acknowledgements. The article was prepared as part of the implementation of the grant funding project of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan «Unexplored stages of the state activities of the khans Ablai, Uali and Bokey (based on rare archival and folklore sources)» (registration number: AR 19680406).

In 1758, the Dzungarian state ceased to exist. After the disappearance of the Dzungar threat, relations between the two peoples became more complicated. While a common enemy had previously often united the two related and neighboring nations, constant conflicts began to arise. Both Kazakhs and Kyrgyz claimed the vacant lands left by the Dzungar, sparking a struggle for control over trade in Central Asia. Incidents of livestock theft by Kyrgyz groups from the Semirechye Kazakhs increased. Attacks on Kazakh trade caravans also became frequent. Therefore, in the 1760s, relations between Kazakhs and Kyrgyz became more strained. In these circumstances, Ablai undertook a series of military expeditions into the Kyrgyz lands. Chinese officials also played a role, actively seeking to further escalate the confrontation that had already caused much suffering to the common people.

In particular, settlements in the lower reaches of the Ili, Chui and Talas river basins were disputed. Worsening relations led to heavy clashes between the two sides in 1759, 1764, 1765, 1766 and 1768 [1, c.53]. In 1760, the Kyrgyz attacked the nomadic tribes of the Dulat and Konrat clans who lived along the banks of the Ili, up to the Chu and Talas and the middle reaches of the Syr Darya. Ablai gathered a significant army and made a retaliatory attack in August of the same year. The sultans of the Kazakh Middle Zhuz invaded the possessions of the Kyrgyz and seized large amounts of booty [2, c.200]. On April 10, 1760, Lieutenant I. Urakov and translator Ya. Gulyaev, who arrived from Ablai Sultan, reported to the Orenburg provincial chancellery about the intention of the Kazakh Khan Abulmamet and Sultan Ablai to fight against the Kyrgyz, who were interfering with the Kazakhs' trade with Central Asia, Kashgaria: «To which he announced to them, that he, Ablai, intends to go to Turkestan this spring, for the Kashkar and Yarken Aikhodzha and Kunyukhodzha write to him, Saltan, that from the attack of the Chinese army of these cities, the inhabitants are experiencing a great burden, so that these inhabitants from the strong army of the attack from those cities in they started to run away from other places. And besides, the people on this side of the cities of Yarkent and Kashkaria in the Kyrgyz mountains to Tashkent, Turkestan and Bukharia and to other cities there are blocking their merchant road. And also to clear this road and bring those Kyrgyz people into peace, they call him, Ablai, and Abulmamet Khan with the army to help them» [3, c.662].

In response to this, the Kyrgyz rulers in 1764 attacked the camps of the Senior and Junior Zhuz in the Ili River valley three times. The Kyrgyz organized a campaign against the Zhetysu Kazakhs, ruining the villages of the Naiman. In the summer of 1765, a 30,000-strong army under the command of Ablai made a successful attack on the Kyrgyz. He entered the Kyrgyz lands, passing through the difficult Sarybel pass, but there his path was blocked by detachments of elders Yesengul, Ersadyr and the famous batyr Ateke-Zhyryk. In the ensuing battle, Ablai defeated the Kirghiz and forced their rulers to peace. This campaign was sung in the famous “Song of Ablai”, recorded by Ch.Ch. Valikhanov [4, c.265-272.].

On September 21, 1765, Ablai Sultan wrote to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Lieutenant General I. I. Springer, about the campaign against the Kyrgyz, naming the reasons for such a campaign. So, in particular, Ablai wrote: «And besides, I announce: this summer I intend to go on a campaign against the Kyrgyz from my uluses and inspect my Kazakhs to see if they are well. Because those Kyrgyz inflicted a lot of insults on our people, and they don't allow any merchants to come to us. And ours send a complaint about this, saying that they are much oppressed. That's why we definitely decided to go» [5, c.103-103].

Despite the victories of the Kazakhs, the conflict was not resolved in the 60s of the 18th century. This was facilitated by the difficult position of the Kazakh Khanate in the international

arena and the continuing threat of the Qing invasion. By the end of the 1760s, Ablai Sultan managed to strengthen the supreme power in most of the Kazakh Khanate. In 1770, Sultan Ablai made a campaign to the Kyrgyz lands. Having crossed the Shatu pass in the valley of the Kyzylsu and Shamsi rivers, the Kazakhs inflicted a heavy defeat on the Kyrgyz militia. Numerous prisoners were resettled in Central Kazakhstan and settled there as personal vassals - the Tolenguts of Ablai [6, c.253].

Ablai was always supported by the large family of Sultanmamet Sultan, his great brother, who roamed in the Middle Irtysh region and ruled the Kipchak ulus. Was 18 years old. So, on November 8, 1765, according to the report of the commander in the Ust-Kamenogorsk fortress, Major General A. M. Kheraskov, to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Lieutenant General I. I. Springer, we see the readiness of Iman Sultan, together with his elder brother, to go on a campaign with Ablai Sultan against Alatau Kyrgyz, who, however, before they had already set out on a campaign, hoping for help from China [7, c.293].

The fact that in November 1765 the battles of Ablai with the Kyrgyz took place on December 5, 1765, was reported in his report by the commander in the Yamyshev fortress, Lieutenant Colonel von Traubenberg, to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Lieutenant General I. I. Springer: «Ablai-sultan more than a month ago with twenty thousand went to war against the wild Kyrgyz people» [7, c.387].

At the end of the 1760s, Kazakh-Kyrgyz relations deteriorated again. On the border of nomadic peoples, theft of cattle from each other often happened, so such facts did not have serious consequences. But, if it came to the destruction of villages, murder and kidnapping of people, then this led to military clashes and casualties. More often than not, the instigators of such conflicts were the Kyrgyz feudal lords. Thus, Kungur Yusupov, Takai Kaipov, and Isergen Ilkebaev, who returned from a trip to the Middle Zhuz, reported in Orenburg on July 8, 1768 that the Kyrgyz barymt workers ruined several villages of Kazakhs wandering near the Syr Darya, and stole about 5 thousand cattle [8, c.182].

Ablai opposed the Kyrgyz manaps, who raided the Uysun and Konrat nomads in Semirechye and Turkestan, defeating them. From the report of Major General S.K. Stanislavsky to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Lieutenant General I.I. Springer about Ablai Sultan, who set out on a campaign on December 31, 1770, clearly shows that one of the important reasons why Sultan Ablai went on a campaign against the Kyrgyz was the fact that the latter prevented his subjects from trading with Tashkent, which in former times was one from the main cities of the Kazakhs [9, c.1-1 о6.].

Ablai went on a campaign against the Kyrgyz in December 1770 with a cavalry army of 20 thousand people. Representatives of the Russian Empire tried to find out through the Kazakhs who came to Satovka whether this was really the case [9, c.1-1 о6.]. During careful questioning, it turned out that the commander of the Semipalatinsk fortress of the Vologda Dragoon Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Bilov, found out some of the details of this campaign through a Kazakh who came to the Semipalatinsk fortress on business. According to the report, the reason for the campaign was the obstruction of the Kyrgyz in trade between the Kazakhs and Tashkent, frequent attacks and killings of people. And the number of troops could be approximately 10 thousand people. The big campaign was preceded by a reconnaissance campaign of one of Ablai's sons into the lands of the Kyrgyz with 2 thousand soldiers, while Ablai collected soldiers from different places [9, c.1-1 о6.].

However, despite the victory won by Ablai, the Kyrgyz manaps after a while again resumed their attacks on trade caravans and Kazakh villages. The fact that there were battles between Ablai

and the Kyrgyz was reported by Kulsary Batyr in his letter to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Lieutenant General I.I. Springer on January 16, 1771, when the former had a 20,000-strong army, he left his eldest son Uali Sultan in his place [9, c.26-26 o6.]

Two years later, Ablai launched a new campaign against the Kyrgyz. This can be seen from the letter of the commander in the Peter and Paul Fortress, Major General S. Stanislavsky, to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Lieutenant General I. A. Delong about the upcoming campaign of Ablai Khan against the Kyrgyz, dated November 16, 1772. [10, c.311]. Ablai left for advice with Sultan Sultanmamet regarding the campaign, while instructing his two sons to go on a campaign against the Kyrgyz. Moreover, here we see the strengthening of separatism of the Atygai batyrs, which was traditionally considered the patrimony of Sultan Ablai. In particular, the Kulebak and Segiz batyrs refused to go on a campaign. We can assume that by this time the above-mentioned warriors were highly dependent on the Russian Empire. In particular, they received an annual salary, as well as the right to travel to the interior of the Russian Empire in the winter.

The Siberian administration of the Russian Empire carried out additional reconnaissance work to clarify the actual goals of Ablai's campaign against the Kyrgyz. Apparently, this was a cross-questioning of other informants to ensure the accuracy of the information received earlier. In this case, the cousin of Khan Ablai, the Sultan of the Kipchak ulus Sultanmamet Sultan, was already interviewed. In his letter, Sultanmamet Sultan wrote to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Lieutenant General I. A. Delong about the arrival of Ablai Khan to him, about the impending war with the wild-stone Kyrgyz on November 29, 1772: «I have this to inform you that this November On the 13th, Ablai Khan came to me with his two sons, and with him fifty Kyrgyz people, for some negotiation with me... We have an intention with him, Ablai, to go to war against the wild Kyrgyz people. And when we go, then I will not fail to let your Excellency know about that campaign» [10, c.369 o6.].

In a letter dated December 8, 1772, Sultanmamet Sultan wrote to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Lieutenant General I. A. Delong, about the upcoming joint campaign against the Kyrgyz together with Ablai Khan: «Ablai Sultan, having stayed with me, safely departed for his nomadic camps. What do you want to know about? And we concluded an agreement with him that we would go in the spring, he with his two sons, and I with eight thousand of our subject Kyrgyz people to fight the wild Kyrgyz people in war» [10, c.397-398].

Sultanmamet reported that the campaign would take place in the spring of 1773 and he was marching with an army of 8 thousand people along with his two sons. Obviously, the Sultan openly revealed his card, knowing in advance that this information would still be known to the Russian side. Moreover, the Russians were not very upset against the Kazakhs' campaign against the Kyrgyz, who were far from the Russian borders. On the contrary, they attracted additional forces of the Kazakhs, who could pose a danger to the Russian Empire. In his letter dated August 23, 1773, Urus-Sultan, the foreman of the Basentinovsky volost, wrote to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Lieutenant General I. A. Delong, about the war with the Kyrgyz, when the Kazakhs captured about 600 Kyrgyz. Ablai's troops participated in these battles under the leadership of his two sons. Ablai himself gave the order to all the elders with their subordinate Kazakhs to move to the Bayanaul tract to convene a council [11, c.147-150 o6.].

Soon, on September 3, 1773, Sergeant Abdulov, who was at Kulsary Batyr, wrote a letter to the commander of the Peter and Paul Fortress, Major General S.K. Stanislavsky, saying that most likely all the Kazakhs who arrived at the council were planning to go on a military campaign against the Kyrgyz [11, c.174-174 o6.].

The Atygai batyr Kulsary secretly informed the commander of the Siberian Corps, Lieutenant General I.A. Delongu on December 26, 1773 in his letter that Ablai gave him the order to prepare for a campaign against the Kyrgyz. This information was transmitted through the Cossack Yegor Bedrina. By the way, for Kulebak's special trust, the batyr received a pistol from the leadership of Western Siberia of the Russian Empire, which was previously strictly prohibited. Apparently, the regional authorities decided to make an exception for their secret informant, who to some extent betrayed his khan [12, c.31-32 о6.].

Kulsara, showing her usefulness and devotion to the Russian crown, gives out secret information regarding Khan Ablai, who is preparing to go on a campaign against the neighboring Alatau Kyrgyz. All Kazakhs were ordered to buy gunpowder and lead in advance and prepare good horses, bows and arrows and spears for the campaign [12, c.38-41 о6.].

Indeed, Ablai's campaign against the Kyrgyz took place, as reported by a number of Kazakh informants and informants. So on January 9, 1774, in his report, the commander of the Semipalatinsk fortress, Colonel I.T. Titov reported to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Major General A.D. Skalon about the campaign of Ablai Khan and his relative Abulfeis Sultan against the Kyrgyz with an army of 60 thousand soldiers, which was a huge number for that time. This information became known to him through the commandant of the Shulbinsky outpost, Captain Ushakov. In turn, this officer received information about this through the elders of the Kirey volost, Umir Batyr, that this army is located at a distance of 10 days' horse riding from the Chinese border [13, c.69]. As can be seen from this report, Khan Ablai united his army with the influential Sultan of the Middle Zhuz, who was subordinate to numerous Nyaman clans with Sultan Abulfeis. Chinese records confirm that Ablai Khan attacked Kyrgyz territory in 1774 [1, c.54].

The fact that the campaign of Ablai and Abulfeis actually took place, followed by a truce, is evidenced by a letter from the Basentine foreman, Sultan Urus Sultan, the eldest son of Sultanmamet Sultan, dated March 26, 1774, addressed to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Major General A.D. Skalon. Reports said that a truce may have been concluded between the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. By the way, the letter addressed to him was transmitted through the same Cossack Yegor Bedrina, who at that time was an intermediary between the Kazakh elders and the highest authorities of Western Siberia [13, c.363].

Sultan Urus, without waiting for an answer and satisfaction of his requests in response to information about the campaign against the Kalmyks, a little later began to insist with his requests, providing information about the Kazakh military campaign against the Kyrgyz that took place, as evidenced by his letter dated June 1, 1774 to the commander of the Siberian corps to Major General A.D. Skalona: Ablai Khan is at war with the Kyrgyz, and received quite a lot of booty and prisoners [13, c.614].

As we see, the war did take place. Ablai captured a large number of prisoners. The trip was successful. By the way, Sultan Urus conveyed information that was not entirely correct and verified, as can be seen from a letter dated June 1, 1774 from a certain A. Apsalimov, who was under the Sultanmamet Sultan for the mullah, addressed to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Major General A.D. Skalon. In this letter, the informant Apsalyamov secretly conveys the actual state of affairs: in the war with the Kyrgyz, the famous Barak Batyr died, his army was also destroyed. Sergeant Major Barak, having gathered a 6 thousandth army, went on a campaign, where he died with the majority of his troops, when only 40 people returned to their nomads. This fact indicates that in that battle the Kazakhs suffered a severe defeat from the Kyrgyz. The Kyrgyz captured many of Ablai Khan's elders, in connection with this Ablai intended not to return to the

uluses this year until the last, and to continue the war [13, c.618]. Ablai was forced to remain in the theater of military operations in order to return the captured elders.

The mullah, who was under the Sultan Mamet Sultan, asked not to extradite him, otherwise he would face death for leaking internal information [13, c.619 o6.]. Of course, this information could be trusted, since the mullah, under pain of death, told the leadership of Western Siberia more truthful information than the Urus Sultan, who openly misinformed the regional authorities. At the same time, we also see that the mullahs and interpreters from among the Tatars and Bukharians who were under the sultans carried out open intelligence and espionage work, weakening the camp of Khan Ablai and the sultans.

At the same time, the top leadership of Siberia received information about the intentions of the people of Ablai, who is on a campaign against the Kyrgyz, to attack the Russian side. This can be seen from the report of the commander in the Peter and Paul Fortress, Brigadier S. Sumorokov, to the commander of the Siberian Corps, Major General A.D. Skalon dated June 10, 1774 about the migration of a large number of Kyrgyz-Kaisaks in the absence of Ablai Khan to the Turgai River with the intention of attacking Russia in the summer and autumn [13, c.671].

As we see, a significant part of the Kazakhs subordinate to Ablai had the intention of attacking the Russians, taking advantage of Ablai's location on the land of the Kyrgyz. At the same time, a number of elders and batyrs remained loyal to Russia, such as: Uali Sultan, foreman Kulsary-batyr, Baizhigit-Murza, Sargadak-batyr and Baytuk Yuldubaev..

At the same time, on June 9, 1774, Sultan Uali reported to the Peter and Paul Fortress about the victory won by the Kazakhs of Khan Ablai over the Kyrgyz: «These days I received news from my father that he defeated up to eight thousand of his enemies. Of which I received a lot for myself. And he sent for the rest to find troops from himself». As can be seen from a short message from Sultan Uali, 8 thousand Kyrgyz were defeated. Many Kyrgyz were captured. A chase was organized for the remaining Kyrgyz.

In the war with the Kyrgyz, Russia took a position to prevent the Kazakhs from strengthening in the military confrontation with the Kyrgyz. For this purpose, she categorically forbade the Russians from selling gunpowder, lead and saltpeter to the Kazakhs. This can be seen from the report of the commander in the Peter and Paul Fortress, Brigadier S.V. Sumorokov to the commander of the separate Siberian Corps, Major General N.G. Ogarev on January 9, 1778, when an attempt was noticed to secretly purchase supplies from Russians and even Tashkent residents. To which, it was ordered not to sell them ammunition under any circumstances and to conduct a thorough inspection of all [14, c.26-26 o6.].

During the military campaigns of the Kazakhs against the Kyrgyz, Ablai sent impossible requests to Russia to send him Russian military detachments. This can be seen from Ablai Khan's letter dated July 24, 1778 to the commander of the Peter and Paul Fortress, Brigadier S.V. Sumorokov, about the need to send him Russian military personnel to intimidate the wild-stone Kyrgyz. Ablai asked Major General Nikolai Gavrilovich Ogarev to send a military team of one hundred people armed with their own weapons and uniforms and with provisions and fodder to the uluses for one month. Ablai planned to use a small Russian detachment for intimidation.

At the same time, Ablai does not hide the fact that earlier for the war with the Kyrgyz he asked for a larger detachment of up to 1000 people and had already reduced his requirements for reinforcements [15, c.94-94 o6.]. But it is not difficult to guess that Russia had no intention of helping the Kazakh side, in particular, Khan Ablai. Although the khan made vain attempts to

achieve his goal, insisting in every possible way that the Russian officer Dudin and the goods of the merchant Shikhov, allegedly robbed by the Kyrgyz, were allegedly in captivity there.

Obviously, Russia refused him. And during almost the entire period that the Kazakhs were in the orbit of Russian politics, there was no case when he would allocate any military detachment to the Kazakhs. This can be seen from the letter of the Orenburg governor I. A. Reinsdorp dated August 13, 1778 to Ablai Khan about the need to independently, without the movement of Russian troops, rescue Captain Dudin from captivity, which will certainly count at the Court in St. Petersburg [15, c.167 o6.]

In his campaign against the Kyrgyz, Ablai was not supported by a number of elders and batyrs, including those from his Atygaev volost. Moreover, all the information about Ablai was delivered to the Russian side. For example, for loyalty to the Kuberyak empire, batyr Ogarev offers to pay him a salary of 100 rubles [16, c.320].

Apparently, the weakening of Khan Ablai, including in the campaign against the Kyrgyz, also occurred from the fact that some influential warriors from his own Atygaev clan, which was considered his ancestral ulus, to which he was assigned at the beginning of his ascension to the khan's family, were not loyal to him. throne.

The fact that in the summer of 1780 Ablai had a military conflict with the Kyrgyz is also evidenced by a letter to the Orenburg governor I. A. Reinsdorp from the commander of the Siberian Corps N. G. Ogarev, where through a number of sources he received the most reliable information about the next war that had begun [16, c.361].

Sultan Mamet Sultan, noting in messages to the Russian administration the exploits of his son Seit in the war with the Kyrgyz, asks him to be appointed successor after his death. In the same letter, Sultanmamet reported on the military spoils of Khan Ablai in the next war with the Kyrgyz and his place of residence in the last year of his life. Khan Ablai was healthy, but his son Chinggis Sultan was ill. He received 9 Kyrgyz families with their tents as amanats so that they would not attack the Kazakhs in the future. The khan lived near Turkestan near Mount Etikant, built a house and was engaged in farming. And he left Uali Sultan in his original place in the north of the Kazakh Khanate.

Almost before his death, in the summer of 1780, Ablai managed to send ambassadors to the Kyrgyz. This can be seen from the report of Ablai Khan's clerk, Meshcheryak Yaguda Usmanov, who reported to the Trinity Fortress on November 22, 1780: «Ablai Khan has no intentions towards China, but wants to return to his uluses next spring after receiving amanat from worthy Kyrgyz» [16, c.372–373].

Thus, after the end of the war with the Kyrgyz, Ablai returned to the Turkestan region, to the border with the Kyrgyz, and from there he raided them. He captured a number of children of noble Kyrgyz families. He divided them between different Sultan's children. The conditions of their detention were very honorable [16, c.385].

The Russians, from the words of famous Kazakhs, highly appreciated the fighting qualities of the Kyrgyz warriors: «Chingis-Soltan and the foreman Dat-batyr said that these people are the Kyrgyz of the same Mohammedan law and are much more numerous in military combat and in all actions against the Kyrgyz horde. kaisak is sharper and more agile» [16, c.388 o6.]

The Russian Empire analyzed, based on all the information coming from the steppe, how Ablai managed to conquer the Kyrgyz: firstly, he made an unexpected offensive when he managed to capture the children of influential Kyrgyz biys, making them amanats. Secondly, he always carried with him a well-armed and equipped Russian soldier named Yakov, who, by his presence,

created the appearance that there were Russian troops in his camp. Thirdly, on the border with the Kyrgyz there was a Chinese border detachment of 500 people, whom Ablai considered as his own, at least he assured his enemy of this, thereby confusing them [16, c.388 o6.].

Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are the ethnically closest peoples of Central Asia; they were united by a common historical destiny, similarity of language, culture and way of life. For centuries, these peoples jointly opposed foreign conquerors and maintained friendly relations with each other. At the beginning of the 18th century. Kazakhs and Kyrgyz united against the Dzungarian invasion and undertook joint campaigns to return the lost nomads on the border with Dzungaria. Despite this, in the 60-70s, Khan Ablai made military campaigns against the Kyrgyz, which some researchers classify as aggressive ones. However, the archival documents we have studied do not give reason to agree with such conclusions. Having won a victory over the Kyrgyz manaps, he did not seize their lands, did not leave their governors, but sought peace, recognition of borders, the return of captured people and stolen livestock. Ablai made three campaigns against the Kyrgyz, in two battles he won a decisive victory, and the third campaign did not lead to military action, the parties came to an agreement even without a fight. As for the cities near the Syrdarya, they were returned by Ablai to the Kazakh Khanate even before his election as khan.

Being a far-sighted politician and subtle diplomat, Ablai Khan understood the possible negative consequences for his people from confrontation with their neighbors. Trade and economic relations were especially important for the Kazakhs. Khan Ablai constantly took care of the safety of trade caravans passing through the steppe, severely punishing those of his subjects who committed livestock theft or caused other damage. At the same time, Khan Ablai reacted sharply to cases of insult and injustice to his subjects from his neighbors.

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